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The "Reasonable Certainty" Standard for Patent Claim
Definiteness: The Standard's Backdrop and Its




In Nautilus v. Biosig Instruments,' the U.S. Supreme Court determined
whether the Federal Circuit's standard of patent claims' definiteness satisfied
the requirements of section 112 of the Patent Act.2 The Court considered the
Federal Circuit's "insolubly ambiguous" standard in the context of a disputed
patent which provided a method for more accurate ECG readings on exercise
equipment.3 In reviewing the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, the Court in-
terpreted section 112 in light of two competing concerns. First, the Court
recognized that patent claims will inevitably contain "[s]ome modicum of
uncertainty."4 Second, the Court insisted that patent claims should be "pre-
cise enough to afford clear notice [to the public] of what is claimed."5 Find-
ing that the Federal Circuit's standard failed to reconcile these competing
concerns, the Court rejected the "insolubly ambiguous" standard and pro-
vided instead a "reasonable certainty" standard to evaluate a patent's defi-
niteness under section 112.6 This new standard provides that patent claims
must be "viewed in light of the specification and prosecution history . . . [so
as to] inform those skilled in the art about the scope of the invention with
reasonable certainty."7
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND OF NAUTILUS
Nautilus involved U.S. Patent No. 5,337,753 ('753 patent) for a heart-
rate monitor that Doctor Gregory Lekhtman invented in 1994 and later as-
* J.D. Candidate, May 2016, SMU Dedman School of Law.
1. Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 2120 (2014).
2. 35 U.S.C. § 112 (a) (2014) (requiring that a patent's specification contain "a
written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making
and using it, in such full, clear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any per-
son skilled in the art to which it pertains ....
3. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124-25.
4. Id. at 2128-29.
5. Id.
6. Id. at 2129.
7. Id. Under the reasonable certainty standard, the success of the indefiniteness
challenges will in large part require a litigant to "seriously consider the use of
expert testimony," as the standard "explicitly refers to the understanding of
those skilled in the art, not lawyers or the public." Ognian V. Shentov, Patent
Indefiniteness After 'Nautilus,' N.Y. L.J., Aug. 4, 2014, at 6, 13, available at
LEXIS doc-id(#1 202665436227#).
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signed to respondent Biosig.8 The '753 patent claimed that its heart rate mon-
itor improved upon other monitors by more precisely measuring the
electromyogram, or EMG, signals of a user's heartbeat during exercise.9 In
typical heart rate monitors, the electrical signals measured are the signals
produced by the user's skeletal muscles, whereas the '753 patent measures
the electrocardiograph (ECG) electrical signals produced by one's heart-
beat.o The patent asserted that existing monitors based on EMG readings
were less accurate than this new technology which monitors ECG signals.],
The EMG signals provide a better measurement because they carry the same
polarity from both of the user's hands. ECG signals, by contrast, detect oppo-
site polarities from a user's hands.12 "[T]he patented device works by mea-
suring equalized EMG signals detected at each hand and then using circuitry
to subtract the identical EMG signals from each other . . . filtering out the
EMG interference."]3 In sum, the new device allows for an accurate reading
because it identifies and removes any EMG reading and, as a result, only
detects the more accurate ECG reading. Therefore, when the user grabs the
exercise equipment's cylindrical bar with both hands, "each hand comes into
contact with two electrodes, one 'live' and one 'common,"' and the heart rate
monitor inserted in the bar measures the electrodes.14
III. PLAINTIFF'S CLAIM
The patent dispute began in the 1990s when Biosig alleged that it dis-
closed the patented device to StairMaster Sports Medical Products, Inc. and
that StairMaster subsequently sold exercise equipment utilizing the device
without first procuring a license from Biosig.15 Biosig also alleged that peti-
tioner Nautilus, following its acquisition of the StairMaster brand, continued
to sell equipment using Biosig's device also without ever obtaining a li-
cense.1 6 Based on these allegations, in 2004, Biosig instituted a patent in-
fringement action in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New
York.17 Soon after Biosig filed its infringement action, Nautilus requested
that the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) reexamine the '753 pat-
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ent. 1 During the PTO reexamination, Biosig and Nautilus voluntarily dis-
missed the infringement action without prejudice.19
In reexamining the patent, the PTO focused "on whether the patent was
anticipated or rendered obvious by prior art-principally, a patent issued in
1984 to an inventor named Fujisaki."20 Apparently, Fujisaki described a heart
rate monitor that, just as the Biosig device, uses "two pairs of electrodes and
a difference amplifier."21 In an effort to distinguish the '753 patent from
Fujisaki's heart rate monitor or other prior art, Biosig produced Doctor
Lekhtman's declaration certifying that "the '753 patent sufficiently informed
a person skilled in the art how to configure" the electrodes to be able to
measure equal EMG signals from both of the user's hands.22 Finding the '753
patent to be distinguishable from prior art, the PTO confirmed the patentabil-
ity of the claims in 2010.23 Following the PTO confirmation, Biosig reinsti-
tuted its infringement action, and, in 2011, the District Court held a hearing
regarding the proper construction of the claim's phrase "in spaced relation-
ship with each other."24
At the hearing, Biosig argued that "spaced relationship" refers to "the
distance between the live electrode and the common electrode in each elec-
trode pair."25 In turn, Nautilus filed a summary judgment motion, contending
that the phrase "spaced relationship" is "indefinite" under section 112.26 The
District Court granted Nautilus' summary judgment, reasoning that the
"spaced relationship" phrase "did not tell [the court] or anyone what pre-
cisely the space should be" and did not designate "any parameters" that
would allow one to determine the proper spacing.27
On appeal from the granting of summary judgment, the Federal Circuit
reversed and remanded the case.28 The court discerned "certain inherent pa-
rameters of the claimed apparatus, which to a skilled artisan may be suffi-
cient to understand the metes and bounds of 'spaced relationship.' "29 One
such parameter is that "the distance separating the live and common elec-
trodes on each half of the bar 'cannot be greater than the width of a user's
18. Id.
19. Id. at 2127.
20. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2126.
21. Id.
22. Id.
23. Id. at 2127.
24. Id.
25. Id.
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hands.' "30 The Supreme Court granted certiorari, vacating and remanding the
case to be decided in accordance with the reasonable certainty standard.31
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE COURT'S STANDARD
One interpretation of Nautilus is that the Supreme Court adopted a new
standard of patent definiteness, completely changing the Federal Circuit's
"insolubly ambiguous" standard.32 "To tolerate imprecision just short of that
rendering a claim 'insolubly ambiguous,"' the Court said, "would diminish
the definiteness requirement's public-notice function and foster the innova-
tion-discouraging 'zone of uncertainty.' "33 The term "zone of uncertainty"
derives from the Court's 1942 interpretation of section 112 in United Carbon
Co. v. Binney & Smith Co., in which the Court used a "zone of uncertainty"
test to determine if a patent claim complied with the definiteness requirement
of the Patent Act.3 4 The Court acknowledged in Nautilus, however, that the
"insolubly ambiguous" standard "may come closer to tracking the statutory
prescription."35 The Court's seemingly contradictory statements indicate that
the new standard of "reasonable certainty" does not completely modify the
Court's previous understanding of section 112 and its underlying policy con-
siderations. Rather, the Court's statements stress that the correct construction
of a patent claim must involve interpreting the definiteness requirement in
light of the competing concerns underlying section 112.36 Thus, the interpre-
tation of section 112, the Court reminded,
entails a "delicate balance." . . . On the one hand, the definiteness
requirement must take into account the inherent limitations of lan-
guage. . . . Some modicum of uncertainty . . . is the "price of
ensuring the appropriate incentives for innovation." . . . One must
bear in mind, moreover, that patents are "not addressed to law-
yers, or even to the public generally," but rather to those skilled in
30. Id.
31. Id. at 2128.
32. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130 (criticizing the "insolubly ambiguous" standard as
"breed[ing] lower court confusion" and "leav[ing] courts and the patent bar at
sea without a reliable compass").
33. Id.
34. See 35 U.S.C § 112(b) (2014); see also United Carbon Co. v. Binney & Smith
Co., 317 U.S. 228, 236 (1942); Sanjeev K. Mahanta, Indefiniteness, 54 IDEA
479, 487-88 (2014).
35. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2130.
36. See id. (quoting Wamer-Jenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co., 520 U.S.
17, 40 (1997) (explaining that "although this Court does not 'micromanag[e]
the Federal Circuit's particular word choice' in applying patent-law doctrines,
we must ensure that the Federal Circuit's test is at least 'probative of essential
inquiry.' ")).
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the relevant art. . . . At the same time, a patent must be precise
enough to afford a clear notice of what is claimed, thereby "ap-
pris[ing] the public of what is still open to them." . . . Otherwise
there would be "[a] zone of uncertainty which enterprise and ex-
perimentation may enter only at the risk of infringement claims."37
In other words, the Court found that the Federal Circuit's standard was inade-
quate because it failed to comport with the competing concerns underlying
section 112.
A. The Court's Competing Policy Concerns: Adequate Notice to the
Public Versus Sufficient Patent Clarity
The Court's referred to a "zone of uncertainty" purposefully. The refer-
ence resurrected the formulation of a definiteness standard for patents that
the Court provided in its 1942 United Carbon decision.38 The "statutory re-
quirement of particularity and distinctness in claims," the Court elucidated,
"is met only when they clearly distinguish what is claimed from what went
before in the art and clearly circumscribe what is foreclosed from future en-
terprise."39 Indeed, it is remarkable that the Court's language in reference to
the "zone of uncertainty" standard in United Carbon stressed one of the com-
peting concerns, the public notice requirement embedded in section 112.40
The public notice requirement is an important principle of the U.S. Pat-
ent System, "[p]remised on a utilitarian theory that the public will benefit in
a society that fosters innovation and rewards ingenuity."41 In fact, the Pro-
gress Clause of Article I of the Constitution gives Congress the power to
"[p]romote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited
Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writ-
ings and Discoveries."42 Some scholars interpret the Progress Clause as es-
tablishing a "patent bargain" in which inventors are given exclusive patent
rights in exchange for their creations.43 The grant of exclusive rights to in-
ventors, however, can only function if one's patent is clear. Thus, clarity
achieves the dual purpose of providing sufficient legal protections for the
patent itself, while also alerting the public of what is still open for discov-
37. Id. at 2128-29 (emphasis added) (internal citations omitted).
38. See Mahanta, supra note 34, at 487-88.
39. United Carbon, 317 U.S. at 236.
40. See 35 U.S.C. § 112(a)-(b) (2014).
41. Giordana Mahn, Comment, Keeping Trolls Out of Court and Out of Pocket:
Expanding the Inequitable Conduct Doctrine, 45 Loy. U. CHI. L.J. 1245,
1246-47 (2014).
42. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
43. Mahn, supra note 41, at 1251.
2015] 63
SMU Science and Technology Law Review
ery.44 The absence of such clarity in a patent claim's definition and scope
invites an abuse of the patent system and promotes inefficiencies.45 Neither
abuse nor inefficiency of the patent system conforms with the Framers' in-
tent.4 6 Thus, in overruling the "insolubly ambiguous" standard, the Supreme
Court attempted to bring the standard for patent claims' definiteness back to
its fundamentally legitimate purpose.
In fact, "the Supreme Court has continuously considered the Framers'
intent and the foundational purpose of the Patent Act."47 It was no different
in Nautilus, in which the Court recast the patent definiteness standard by
faithfully adhering to the Patent Act's text and its underlying public policy
considerations.4 8 The Court held that "[t]he Patent Act of 1870 expressly
conditioned the receipt of a patent on the inventor's inclusion of one or more
such claims, described with particularity and distinctness."49 The Court then
stressed that the "1870 Act's definiteness requirement survives today, largely
unaltered."5 0 In determining the appropriate standard to test a patent's defi-
niteness and particularity, the Court emphasized two competing principles.51
On one hand, the Court recognized the "inherent limitations of language."52
On the other hand, the Court also stressed the importance of the notice func-
tion patents provide to the public.53 Absent the proper balance between "defi-
niteness" and public notice, "patent applicants face powerful incentives to
inject ambiguity into their claims."54 Mindful of the foregoing considera-
44. "As the law stands today, each patent grants the owner 'the right to exclude
others from making, using, offering for sale, or selling the invention."' Id. at
1253 (quoting 35 U.S.C. § 154 (a)(1) (2014)).
45. Judge Plager makes a potent argument that the "insolubly ambiguous" standard
lends a patent claim's definition to a number of plausible interpretations, de-
claring that the "[i]nefficiencies of this system, and its potential inequities, are
well known in the trade." See Mahanta, supra note 34, at 490.
46. See id. at 1247.
47. Id. at 1281.
48. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2125.
49. Id.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 2128.
52. Id.
53. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128-29.
54. Id. at 2129; see also Shentov, supra note 7, at 1 (stating that "many litigated
patents have terms that are ambiguous by the drafter's design, or have multiple
different but plausible interpretations, enabling patentees to argue for a mean-
ing most favorable under the circumstances of a given case" and arguing that if
a patent claim's definiteness standard is prone to an interpretative manipula-
tion, it can breed a fertile ground for abusive litigation based on a patent in-
fringement claim).
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tions, the Court formulated a "reasonable certainty" standard, arguing that
the Federal Circuit's "insolubly ambiguous" standard steered away from the
Framers' vision of the U.S. Patent system. 55 Therefore, with Nautilus, the
Court brought the standard back to its constitutional roots thirteen years after
the Federal Circuit's 2001 Exxon Research & Engineering Co. v. United
States opinion, in which it announced for the first time the "insolubly ambig-
uous" standard.56 The Court concluded that the "insolubly ambiguous" stan-
dard lacked the precision that section 112 demands, rendering itself
unreliable and prone to abusive litigation of patent infringement claims.57
B. The Recent Rise of Patent Infringement Litigation by Patent
Asserting Entities (PAEs), Better Known as Patent Trolls
The decision in Nautilus is especially important given the recent in-
crease of infringement claims brought by Patent Asserting Entities (PAEs).
In fact, the increased number of lawsuits has captured the attention of Con-
gress and the president.58 As one intellectual property scholar observed,
"PAE infringement suits overwhelm federal courts, accumulate the largest
costs, and have millions of dollars at stake."59 In light of PAEs' emergence
and their harmful effects on innovation and the U.S. economy, Congress en-
acted the 2011 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (AIA) and the 2013 Inno-
vation Act.60 Neither act, however, specifically addressed how courts should
55. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2129-30.
56. Mahanta, supra note 34, at 490 (citing Exxon Research and Eng'g Co. v.
United States, 265 F.3d 1371, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2001)).
57. See Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. 2129-30; Mahanta, supra note 34, at 499-500 (stating
"[i]t is worth noting that among the three key factors identified in the study that
likely contributed to the many recent patent infringement lawsuits, one was the
prevalence of patents with unclear property rights, albeit mostly related to
software-related patents that often have overly broad or unclear claims, or
both.... Interestingly, contrary to the common perception, the study reported
that recent increase in litigation was driven more by the prevalence of low
quality patents. . . . Patents with unclear claims can be a tool in the hands of
one determined to exploit the tolerance of indefiniteness in patent claims.")
(citing U.S. Gov'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-13-465, INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY: ASSESSING FACTORS THAT AFFECT PATENT INFRINGEMENT LITIGA-
TION COULD HELP IMPROVE PATENT QUALITY (Aug. 2013)).
58. Christopher Hu, Some Observations on the Patent Troll Litigation Problem, 26
No. 8 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 10, 10 (2014).
59. Mahn, supra note 41, at 1266. "PAEs are an unfortunate and opportunistic
byproduct of the patent system." Id. at 1283.
60. Id. at 1278-80. The AIA, for instance, addressed a forum shopping concern by
limiting "PAEs from joining multiple defendants in one suit," thereby prevent-
ing them from "easily transfer[ring] venue to choose their forum." Id. The In-
novation Act "discourages litigants from hiding behind shell companies by
requiring them to reveal the identity of the parent entity, requires more details
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interpret the meaning of patent claim terms-an integral part of patent in-
fringement litigation-to diminish the rising number of patent infringement
cases. Sensitive to "the concerns voiced by many, including Congress and the
President ... the US patent system needs to be changed in order to ensure
that it promotes innovation rather than impeding it."61 By replacing the "in-
solubly ambiguous" standard with the "reasonable certainty" standard, the
Supreme Court fortified defenses to patent infringement claims.62 It is not yet
certain how lower courts will apply the "reasonable certainty" standard to
test its effectiveness in impeding meritless PAE infringement suits.63 Rather
than waiting to see how lower courts will apply the new standard, however, it
may be useful to understand who the PAEs are, why it is easy for them to
instigate patent infringement actions, and how the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard is a "toothless defense" to such actions.64
C. PAE Opportunism of the "Insolubly Ambiguous" Standard in
Bringing Patent Infringement Actions
PAEs represent a subgroup of Non-Practicing Entities (NPEs) that are
"often compared with the mythological troll who lurks under a bridge it did
not build, demanding payment from anybody who wants to pass."65 The anal-
ogy is appropriate as NPEs "assert patent rights without [inventing or] actu-
ally practicing the technology."66 Thus, NPEs claim ownership of a given
invention by falsely accusing actual inventors of the very crime the NPEs are
committing. Specifically, NPEs "will notify the product company of alleged
infringement and threaten litigation unless the company licenses the patent in
order to continue production."67 The result is a patent holdup, during which
NPEs "overcharge a defendant through licensing fees because the defendant
cannot afford to take its product off the market."68 This predatory behavior
leads to several significant inferences. First, NPEs find false patent rights
assertions to be more lucrative than the penalties associated with any legal
regarding infringement allegations . . . limits discovery . . . and includes a
loser-pay provision, which requires the non-prevailing party to pay their oppo-
nents' litigation costs unless the losing party's conduct was 'reasonably justi-
fied."' Id. at 1280.
61. Daniel Ilan & Jane Rosen, Supreme Court Curbs Patentability of Computerized
Business Methods, 26 No. 9 INTELL. PROP. & TECH. L.J. 8, 11 (2014).
62. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2124.
63. Notably, the Court declined to apply its "reasonable certainty" standard, appar-
ently having no doubts as to the way lower courts would interpret and apply it.
64. Shentov, supra note 7, at 6.
65. Mahn, supra note 41, at 1248.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 1264.
68. Id.
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deterrence they currently face.69 Second, NPEs are likely to target start-ups,
particularly "[high-tech and business method patents, including software
patents [that because of their technology's complexity must] have ambiguous
construction of patent claims," or other "vulnerable defendants who easily
succumb to settlement instead of challenging the allegations at trial."70 Fi-
nally, NPEs' opportunistic exploitation of the "insolubly ambiguous" stan-
dard demonstrates the standard's malleability.
Without this malleable standard, NPEs would lose an avenue for filing
their false claims. In falsely asserting their patent rights, NPEs follow "a
common game plan."71 They file a complaint in a "plaintiff-friendly forum,"
alleging infringement using ambiguous terms that merely match language
"from advertising or marketing materials" and pleading inconsistent causes
of action "without pleading them in the alternative."72 At the construction
stage of a claim, because the patent claim lacks definiteness and omits speci-
fications, NPEs usually propose that the courts employ the "plain and ordi-
nary meaning" of the terms, which the courts usually adopt.73 Additionally,
NPEs stand to "recover damages often ranging in the millions without show-
ing injury to their market share."74 It is no wonder that the NPEs' predatory
tactics and the courts' willingness to interpret the "insolubly ambiguous"
standard in the NPEs' favor discourages innovation and causes harm to the
economy.
Business entities have no spare time or money to ward off the trolls, yet
the troll threat is concrete, no matter the financial vitality of a business.75
According to one commentator, "[t]he median cost of defending a troll case
ranges from $1.25 million for cases with $10 million or less at stake, to $2.4
69. See Hu, supra note 59, at 12. ("Rule 11 sanctions rarely are assessed against
plaintiffs and their counsel who do not perform an adequate pre-suit investiga-
tion and who maintain a case despite clear indications that the case lacks merit.
Other sanctions, such as those under 28 U.S.C. § 1927, are even rarer.").
70. See Mahn, supra note 41, at 1258, 1263, 1268-69.
71. Hu, supra note 59, at 11.
72. Id.
73. Id. at 12; see Mahanta, supra note 34, at 491 (reviewing how the lower courts
applied the insolubly ambiguous standard in various cases by illustrating its
malleability at the hands of various judges). "Different Federal Circuit judges,
reading the same patent specification and claim frequently, arrive at different
conclusions from district court judges and one another as to the claim's mean-
ing. This is not surprising given that courts may consult a vast range of sources
including claim language, the specification, prosecution history, general and
technical dictionaries, treatises, expert testimony, and multiple canons of inter-
pretation to derive a construction." Id.
74. Mahn, supra note 41, at 1263.
75. Evidently, the trolls' tactics "threaten to shut down the entire manufacture and
sale" of a given product. See Mahn, supra note 41, at 1270.
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million for cases with $10 to $25 million at stake, to $4 million for cases
with $25,000,000 or more at stake."76 The money spent defending against
trolls siphons off funds that businesses had originally allocated to their re-
search and development efforts.77 Cognizant of the costs involved in patent
infringement litigation, businesses opt to "settle nine times out of ten."78 The
high preference for settlement reveals, among other things, that businesses
have little or no confidence in the protections that the judicial system affords
them in defending patent infringement claims. Thus, the Supreme Court in-
tervened to bolster businesses' defenses against obnoxious trolls.79
D. The Effect of Nautilus's Change on the Balance of Power in
Favor of Defendants in Patent Infringement Actions
While the Supreme Court's "reasonable certainty" standard falls short of
completely overhauling the "insolubly ambiguous" standard in patent claims
construction, the new standard claims to comply with the definiteness re-
quirements of section 112 by achieving a "delicate balance" between a clear
public notice requirement and some "modicum of uncertainty" in the inven-
tions' descriptions.80 Practically speaking, however, the "reasonable cer-
tainty" standard fails to advance these goals, as it is just as amorphous as the
"insolubly ambiguous" standard. While "reasonable" and "certainty" re-
present legally entrenched phrases that legal practitioners commonly use,
courts still have as much latitude in applying the "reasonable certainty" stan-
dard as they had in applying the "insolubly ambiguous" standard.8' Questions
of "certainty" and "reasonableness" necessarily implicate subjective interpre-
tations in light of a given case's context. The Supreme Court's reluctance to
craft a more rigid rule reflects that the Patent Act's competing concerns fail
to allow one to provide a bright line rule.82 Different cases involve different
types of inventions, some of which by their nature-such as high-tech
software patents-require more ambiguity in their claim descriptions than
others. Allowing this ambiguity is the price of encouraging innovation.
76. Hu, supra note 59, at 10-11.
77. See Mahn, supra note 41, at 1271.
78. Id. at 1264.
79. Interestingly, patent infringement actions asserted by trolls are so lucrative that
investors choose to invest their funds in trolls as opposed to start-ups because
the former produce more attractive returns. The corollary is that, theoretically,
investors wield Excalibur, which could ward off trolls by cutting off their ac-
cess to funds. However, investors' self-interest, in practice, cannot but dictate a
contrary course of action. See id. at 1273.
80. Nautilus, 134 S. Ct. at 2128.
81. See Mahanta, supra note 34, at 491.
82. See id. at 482-88.
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Following Nautilus, what is certain in patent claims construction is that
courts will need to apply the "reasonable certainty" standard mindful of the
competing concerns underlying the patent definiteness statute. Practitioners
will need to draft patent claims to give a sufficiently clear public notice of
what is being claimed, yet avoid being too precise by sufficiently informing
those skilled in the art of a given invention's distinctive attribute. Thus, Nau-
tilus's major contribution to the law of patent indefiniteness lies in stressing
to practitioners and lower courts the importance of the Patent Act's compet-
ing concerns in drafting and interpreting patent claims. The "reasonable cer-
tainty" standard is unlikely to drastically reduce lawsuits filed by PAEs.
Nevertheless, the new standard significantly strengthens the defense of indef-
initeness in such suits, because it elevates the quality of patent claims by
requiring practitioners to draft more precise patent claims.83 In fact, the rea-
sonable certainty standard is likely to invite more litigation than before. The
addition of the reasonableness inquiry into the analysis means that indefinite-
ness will move away from a pure question of law and into a factual inquiry.
Whether a disputed claim term is indefinite has traditionally been seen as
part of claim construction but, following Nautilus, has the potential of being
shifted to a question for trial.84
83. "The patent troll problem has many facets, and a simple solution does not ex-
ist." Hu, supra note 59, at 13.
84. Shentov, supra note 7, at 3.
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